Metaphor, religious language and religious experience by Harrison, V.S.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harrison, V.S. (2007) Metaphor, religious language and religious 
experience. Sophia: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 
46(2):pp. 127-145.
 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/3850/ 
 
Deposited on: 03 December 2007 
 
 
Glasgow ePrints Service 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
  
 
Metaphor, Religious Language and 
Religious Experience 
 
 
Victoria S. Harrison 
University of Glasgow 
 
Dr V. Harrison 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow G12 8QQ 
Scotland 
UK 
 
E-mail: V.Harrison@philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: 
 
Is it possible to talk about God without either misrepresentation or failing to assert 
anything of significance? The article begins by reviewing how, in attempting to answer 
this question, traditional theories of religious language have failed to sidestep both 
potential pitfalls adequately. After arguing that recently developed theories of metaphor 
seem better able to shed light on the nature of religious language, it considers the claim 
that huge areas of our language and, consequently, of our experience are shaped by 
metaphors. Finally, it considers some of the more significant implications of this claim for 
our understanding of both religious language and religious experience. 
 
 1
Metaphor, Religious Language and Religious Experience 
 
Is it possible to talk about God
1
 without either misrepresentation or failing to assert anything 
of significance? In an attempt to answer this question, I begin by reviewing how traditional 
theories of religious language have failed to sidestep both potential pitfalls adequately. I then 
turn to recent developments in the theory of metaphor—developments that seem better able to 
explain how speakers are capable of referring to God successfully without having to 
misrepresent the divine. 
Before proceeding, however, some clarification of the term ‘religious language’ is 
required. ‘Religious language’, as employed by religious scholars in the everyday sense, 
refers to the written and spoken language typically used by religious believers when they talk 
about their religious beliefs and their religious experiences. The term also covers the language 
used in sacred texts and in worship and prayer.
2
 Use of the term ‘religious language’ might 
suggest that there is a special ‘religious’ component of natural languages, which is easily 
distinguishable from the normal, secular component of these languages. This, however, is 
clearly not the case. For when believers employ ‘religious language’, they do not use 
completely different words to those uttered by their non-religious contemporaries.
3
 While 
certain words may be uttered by believers with greater frequency than by atheists, 
nonetheless, the words that feature in ‘religious language’ are the same words that are used in 
‘non-religious language’.
4
 Even a word as quintessentially religious as ‘God’ appears in the 
language of many non-religious people in the context of a variety of commonly used curses. 
Moreover, if one were to open a page of the scriptures of Judaism, Christianity or Islam most 
of the words on that page would seem to bear the same mundane meaning as they do in 
ordinary, ‘secular’ discourse. In short, it would seem that the religiosity of language cannot lie 
in the actual words used but in something else. I suggest that that the ‘something else’ 
consists principally, although not exclusively, in two factors: first, the ‘religious’ purpose 
some language serves, and, secondly, the overtly ‘religious’ context of some linguistic uses. 
The term ‘religious language’, as used here, then, should be regarded as shorthand for 
‘language that is used either to serve a religious purpose or in a religious context, or both’.
5
 
 Given how much ‘religious language’ and ‘ordinary language’ have in common, it should 
not surprise us that, at the level of theory and interpretation, many people tend to regard them 
as on a par. So, for example, in a culture in which ordinary language is regarded as primarily 
descriptive of what is ‘literally’ the case, it is likely that religious language will be viewed as 
similarly oriented. Indeed, it seems that whichever theory of ordinary language is popular at 
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any given time effects the way that religious language is conceived. This notwithstanding, 
throughout the ages religious thinkers have found it necessary to develop distinctive theories 
of religious language. What is it, then, about religious language that seems to require a special 
account? A significant portion of the religious language used by traditional Jews, Christians 
and Muslims concerns a God that is conceived to be transcendent to the world. How can 
human languages, which seem better suited to describing the mundane world of our everyday 
experiences, purport to describe or refer to something that transcends this world? Many 
religious thinkers, both traditional and modern, have been deeply puzzled by this question, 
and their theories of religious language attempt to provide an answer to it.  
 
I. Traditional theories of religious language 
 
Martin Luther was certainly not the first to be a literalist about religious language, particularly 
with respect to the language of religious texts. Nevertheless, he is held by many to be 
responsible for the increased prominence given, from the onset of the modern period, to the 
literal meaning of religious language. As an example of this literalism, consider Luther’s 
insistence that 
 
[n]o violence is to be done to the words of God, whether by man or angel; but they are to be 
retained in their simplest meaning wherever possible, and to be understood in their grammatical 
and literal sense unless the context plainly forbids, lest we give our adversaries occasion to make a 
mockery of all the Scriptures.
6
 
 
Clearly, the emphasis placed on the literal meaning of the Christian Scriptures by Luther and 
his contemporary reformers was part of their wider agenda, the intention being to shift the 
responsibility for interpreting the sacred texts away from the established Church and onto the 
individual (male) Christian. Instead of the Church evaluating the meaning of the Scriptures, 
the reformers hoped that the Scriptures could be used to judge what was of value in the 
Church. Luther held that ordinary literate people should be able to read and understand the 
Bible without the help of the interpretation authorized by the religious establishment. 
Consequently, he argued that the words of the Bible are to be understood in their literal sense, 
that is, in the sense that they possess in other areas of discourse. On this view, when the Bible 
refers to God as ‘Father’, for example, then the word ‘Father’ means exactly what it means 
when it is used with reference to a non-divine patriarch.  
 3
 The view of religious language popularized by Luther became dominant in the Protestant 
churches of Northern Europe, from where it eventually spread to the Protestant churches of 
North America. And in North America, particularly, and despite growing recognition that 
some interpretation is inevitable even when one is committed to reading the Bible as literally 
as possible, this view remained influential throughout the twentieth century. Its popularity 
notwithstanding, biblical literalism (as, within the context of Christianity, this view is often 
called today) has been subjected to vigorous criticism. Russell McCutcheon, for example, 
remarks that ‘it should be apparent that, when reading a document that reflects the entrenched 
cultural and historical context of people half a world away and reaching back thousands of 
years, it is utterly impossible to take the entire document literally’.
7
 Furthermore, in the 
twentieth century, there was increased sensitivity to, what appeared to many as, the hypocrisy 
of those claiming to interpret the Bible literally while nevertheless being highly selective in 
the parts they chose to take seriously.
8 Despite the problems a religious group exposes itself 
to when it claims to interpret the Bible literally, the view that Scripture, as the Word of God, 
does not stand in need of interpretation dies hard. Moreover, emphasis on the literal meaning 
of religious language has not been limited to Protestant Christians. It has also been the 
dominant view of religious language in the Muslim tradition, as well as having enjoyed some 
popularity among certain sectors of the Jewish community. Indeed, in segments of each of 
these traditions it remained a powerful force at the end of the twentieth century. 
However, there is, surely, a certain oddity about the claim that religious language, 
particularly language that purports to refer to a world-transcendent God, literally describes the 
way things are, and that the words used have the same literal meaning as they do when 
applied to things that are ‘of this world’. The oddity is caused by the fact that language which 
purports to be about God inevitably involves words whose meaning would seem to derive 
from the world of our experience; whereas a world-transcendent God is not within the range 
of what we can possibly experience. When theists claim to use language about God literally, 
then, how can they avoid undermining the firm conceptual distinction between God and the 
world—a distinction maintained by all the traditional forms of Abrahamic monotheism? The 
claim that language can be used literally in a religious context can easily give the impression 
that the God theists believe in is just like us, only better: more knowledgeable, more 
powerful, and so on. 
 Those who are most sensitive to this difficulty have tended to adopt some form of via 
negativa, an extreme form of which having been popularized in the Middle Ages by the 
influential Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides.
9
 Maimonides claims that statements 
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predicating ‘positive attributes’ to the divine being—that is, statements of the form ‘God 
is…’—are theologically illegitimate and should never be employed. Only statements of the 
form ‘God is not…’ are, Maimonides argues, legitimate. 
 At first sight, though, it may seem strange that adherents of the via negativa should 
attempt to speak about God at all. If one cannot say anything about God except regarding 
what God is not, then why not remain silent? Maimonides, however, clearly believes that 
language can play a role in leading to an understanding of God. For at one point he states that 
by considering God’s negative attributes ‘you will come nearer to the knowledge and 
comprehension of God’.
10
 How precisely, though, does religious language work? In 
Maimonides’ view, language about God is valuable only insofar as it is capable of evoking an 
experience of the divine. The purpose of religious language is not, then, to provide a definite 
description of God or to convey information about the divine in propositional form. Rather, it 
is to facilitate religious experience and to inspire prayer. Furthermore, Maimonides does not 
merely claim that one would be mistaken if one were to make statements predicating ‘positive 
attributes’ of God; he also claims that one would thereby lose one’s belief in God. What 
might motivate this extraordinary claim? What is the connection, in his view, between 
predicating ‘positive attributes’ of God and losing one’s belief in God? The idea would seem 
to be that the result of predicating ‘positive attributes’ of God is that one arrives at an image 
of God that is formed by compiling together a number of concepts that denote finite 
qualities—and the ‘God’ represented by such limited concepts could not inspire belief. Thus, 
only by limiting one’s claims about God to statements about what God is not can one 
preserve a concept ‘God’ that is both responsible to the purported reality and, at the same 
time, credible.
11
 
 However, in their efforts to avoid misrepresenting God, those who adopt the via negativa 
seem to court another danger—that of saying nothing at all about God. Moreover, if all one 
can say is that God is not this, that, or the other, it may well be difficult for one’s interlocutor 
to resist the conclusion that God is nothing at all. Despite this danger, the via negativa has 
struck many religious thinkers as the best available theory of religious language. Indeed, it 
enjoyed something of a renaissance in the twentieth century. 
 A third traditional theory of religious language was developed by Thomas Aquinas, who 
was convinced that, because the divinity is radically different from all other beings, little of 
our language could be applied univocally (or, literally) to God. However, Aquinas felt 
compelled to reject the obvious alternative: namely, the view that most of the words used in 
religious language are equivocal, having an entirely different meaning to the one they possess 
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when employed in non-religious discourse—these two different meanings being as unrelated 
as, for example, the various meanings of the word ‘bat’. The problem with this alternative 
view is that, if religious language were simply equivocal, then it seems that we could never 
know whether or not we were describing God correctly. For, whereas we can certainly acquire 
the mundane meanings of words, what would enable us to grasp the religious meanings? And 
if we do not understand the religious meanings, we would not be able to make true statements 
about God. And hence, we would lack all knowledge of the divinity. But we do possess some 
knowledge of God through revelation. Therefore, Aquinas concluded that when we refer to 
God, we cannot be employing words equivocally. 
 As an alternative both to the view that religious language was univocal and to the view 
that it was equivocal, Aquinas proposed that religious discourse was analogical, placing 
particular emphasis on a variety of analogy that he terms ‘analogy of attribution’. Aquinas 
illustrates analogy of attribution with the following example. Consider the word ‘health’. 
When we think of healthy people we attribute health to them in a literal sense. But we might 
also think of medicine as healthy. However, it is clear that medicine is not healthy in the same 
way in which people are healthy. By means of this example, Aquinas identified a use of 
words that he believed falls somewhere between the univocal and the equivocal. And it is by 
speaking in this manner—by employing analogies of attribution—that, Aquinas holds, we can 
talk meaningfully about God. As he writes: 
 
some words are used neither univocally nor purely equivocally of God and creatures, but 
analogically, for we cannot speak of God at all except in the language we use of creatures, and so 
whatever is said both of God and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God 
as to their source and cause in which all perfections of things pre-exist transcendentally.12 
 
Clearly, Aquinas conceived of God as the first, or uncaused, cause of everything that is. He 
also believed that causes must bear some similarity to their effects—or, in other words, that 
whatever quality an effect possessed had to be present in its cause. As an example, he thought 
that whatever causes goodness in the world must itself be good. Because God is the cause of 
everything that exists, we can, therefore, correctly attribute to the divinity properties of 
worldly things—goodness, for example. 
 Of course, there is an obvious problem here, which Aquinas anticipated. His theory would 
seem to allow that all our terms are equally applicable to God, and it would therefore appear 
to provide no grounds for deciding what may, and what may not, be correctly said of God. 
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Thus, there would be no significant difference between saying ‘God is a rose’ and saying 
‘God is a father’, because God is the cause of both roses and fathers. Aquinas attempted to 
sidestep this difficulty by arguing that, since God is infinite, terms that are capable of 
referring to the infinite are the ones most suitable for applying to the divine. While this 
excludes words like ‘rose’, it allows words like ‘good’ to be used in describing God. 
However, this strategy also excludes words like ‘father’—words that Aquinas clearly is 
interested in retaining. So, he further modifies the theory to include metaphors, which he 
regarded as a valuable means of genuinely saying something about God. Nevertheless, he 
maintained that metaphor was not as important within religious language as analogy. Because 
of the primacy he accorded to analogy over metaphor, he failed to develop a detailed account 
of the way that metaphor functions in religious language. 
 Moreover, there appears to be a serious flaw in Aquinas’ account of analogy. The problem 
lies in Aquinas’ understanding of causation—a notion that plays a key role in his theory. For 
the reason why certain terms can be applied to God analogically, he argues, is because God is 
the cause of all things. In short, Aquinas assumes that whatever qualities an effect had must 
be present transcendentally in the cause of that effect. And he took this to entail that effects 
must bear some likeness to their causes. Consequently, given his belief that God is the cause 
of everything that exists, Aquinas held that there is a certain qualified likeness between God 
the creator and God’s creatures. In technical theological terms, this likeness is known as the 
analogia entis. It is because of this special likeness between God and ‘His’ creation that, 
according to Aquinas, we are able to use words analogically in order to speak about God. So, 
Aquinas’ theory of analogy depends upon a specific understanding of what causation 
involves. Clearly, if one rejects this view of causation, and most people today would reject the 
assumption that whatever qualities an effect possesses must be present transcendentally in its 
cause, then Aquinas’ theory loses its power to explain how words can be used analogically to 
refer to God. Indeed, in the twentieth century, the theory of religious language as analogical 
struck many people as unpersuasive precisely because they no longer shared Aquinas’ beliefs 
about causation, and hence no longer subscribed to a worldview that recognized the analogia 
entis. 
 Each of the three traditional theories of religious language was developed as a response to 
the question: how can religious language meaningfully refer to a God who, if such exists, is 
radically different from everything else to which our language refers? Both Aquinas’ 
analogical theory of religious language and the via negativa were attempts to find a middle 
way between the twin dangers of misrepresenting God, on the one hand, and failing to talk 
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meaningfully, on the other. The fear underlying this seeming dilemma is that the gap between 
God and any human conceptual scheme is so great that anything we might attempt to say 
about God would be either meaningless or a complete misrepresentation. Moreover, the 
avoidance of one danger seems to lead to the other: for in order to prevent language about 
God appearing meaningless, some have felt the need to try to make it as precise as possible. 
But the more precise religious language becomes, and as a result, the more specific becomes 
one’s conception of God, the greater is the risk of misrepresenting the divinity. Theories of 
religious language, both traditional and modern, have thus been shaped by their framer’s 
perception of where the greatest danger lies. 
 Aquinas clearly feared that meaninglessness posed the greatest danger to religious belief. 
And while avoiding the pitfall of possible misrepresentation by pointing out that language is 
not univocal (or literal), he set about trying to show how non-literal language can nevertheless 
be meaningful: it can convey meaning through analogy. Thus his theory of religious language 
served to explain the way in which it could be meaningful without appealing to the univocal 
commitments of those who understood religious language literally. Advocates of the via 
negativa, in contrast, took misrepresentation to be the greatest danger. While seeking to avoid 
the pitfall of meaningless talk—though how successfully is moot—by making literally true 
claims (such as ‘God is not material’), they avoided misrepresenting God by refusing to say 
anything positive about the divine. It is notable how the problem of religious language, as it 
persisted in twentieth-century philosophy of religion, retained the same basic form that it held 
in the Middle Ages: how one can meaningfully use language about God without wholesale 
misrepresentation of the divinity. 
 However, the charge that all language purporting to refer to God was meaningless, 
advanced in the early-twentieth century by the logical positivists, stimulated a renewed 
interest in certain quarters in theories, such as that of Aquinas, which attempted to explain 
how religious language could, nevertheless, be meaningful. However, given that Aquinas’ 
theory is unacceptable to many modern people because of its seemingly antiquated 
metaphysical presuppositions, a number of religious believers began to search for alternative 
ways of understanding the language they employed to talk about their religious beliefs and 
experiences. One seemingly fecund approach is to treat religious discourse as metaphorical. 
 
II. Religious language as metaphor 
 
Metaphor is a figure of speech in which we speak about one thing in terms that are usually 
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employed to talk about something else.
13
 Although metaphor is ubiquitous within ordinary, as 
well as within explicitly poetic, speech and writing, until the twentieth century metaphorical 
expressions were commonly regarded as inferior to non-figurative ones. The belief that only 
literal language is capable of being true, which is commonly attributed to Plato, has been held 
responsible for the view that metaphors only play a minor linguistic role. Until recently, most 
philosophers assumed that metaphors were merely ornamental, and were, moreover, 
translatable into literal language without loss of meaning. In other words, they subscribed to 
the ‘substitution theory’, according to which, in metaphorical uses of language, certain 
figurative words are substituted for other non-figurative words. Thus, the metaphor can be 
eliminated by simply substituting back the original word.
14
 
 It was only in the twentieth century, when people began to think about language in new 
ways, that certain philosophers began to develop more adequate theories of metaphor. Given 
the importance of metaphor within religious texts, it is no surprise that these new theories can 
be employed to shed light on the nature of religious language. 
 
Richards and Black on Metaphor 
 
I. A. Richards was the first to reconsider the role metaphors play in language, and hence the 
first to reject the substitution theory,
15
 with Max Black following his lead. Both insist that, far 
from being merely ornamental and reducible to literal language (as the substitution theory 
claimed), metaphors can be used to say things that cannot be said in any other way. 
Consequently, they play an irreplaceable role in our language.
16
 In arguing against the 
substitution theory, both Richards and Black reject the view that individual words are the 
bearers of meaning. Instead, the relationship between words and meaning is far more 
complex, which Richards sought to elucidate by means of, what he calls, an ‘interanimative’ 
theory of metaphor. 
 Rather than construe individual words as possessing a meaning that is fixed independently 
both of the way they are used and of the context of their utterance, Richards proposes that the 
meaning of words can only be arrived at through considering ‘the interplay of the interpretive 
possibilities of the whole utterance’ in which the words are lodged.
17
 In the case of metaphor, 
the interpretive possibilities are extended. Consider the use of ‘pig’ as a metaphor for 
‘glutton’. When we call someone a pig, we elicit both the thought of a pig and the thought of 
a glutton. In Richards’ view, ‘when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different 
things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is the result 
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of their interaction.’
18
 A metaphor, then, does not work simply by bringing together two 
words, each with its own fixed meaning, and thereby somehow producing a meaning that is a 
fusion of the two original meanings. Rather, a successful metaphor, in Richards’ view, creates 
a new meaning from the interaction, or ‘interanimation’, of the two original meanings. In 
other words, metaphors operate by drawing together pairs of meaning that are not usually 
thought of together. Richards’ key idea is that both are essential to the success of the 
metaphor as a generator of meaning.  
 Black developed a similar theory, which he calls the ‘interactive theory of metaphor’, but 
adds that metaphors make certain features prominent, and that this then shapes our 
perception. As he argues by means of the metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’: ‘Any human traits that 
can without undue strain be talked about in “wolf-language” will be rendered prominent, and 
any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some 
details, emphasizes others—in short, organizes our view of man.’
19
 Hence, Black holds that, 
in bringing together the complex frameworks of meaning invoked by the terms ‘man’ and 
‘wolf’, the metaphor works in a much more subtle way than the traditional substitution theory 
acknowledges. In forcing us to select which aspects of talk about wolves can be applied to 
man and which cannot, the metaphor changes the way in which we think about man. If the 
metaphor succeeds, henceforth the meanings associated with the word ‘man’ will, in part, be 
structured by the meanings associated with wolves. Thus, an important change will have 
taken place in the way we think about men—a change that cannot be irreducibly expressed in 
literal language. Moreover, our thinking about wolves will not remain unchanged for, ‘if to 
call a man a wolf is to put him in a special light, we must not forget that the metaphor makes 
the wolf seem more human than he otherwise would.’
20
 
 
Soskice on Metaphor and Religious Language 
 
Janet Martin Soskice has employed the theories of both Richards and Black to develop what 
is, perhaps, the most influential account of metaphor and religious language to appear to 
date.
21
 Like Richards and Black, she rejects the substitution theory of metaphor, and 
emphasizes the role metaphors play in generating new perspectives capable of increasing our 
understanding. In her view, by generating new perspectives, successful metaphors expand our 
descriptive powers in a way that other types of linguistic expressions do not.
22
 In short, 
metaphors ‘disclose’ to view what has not been previously available.
23
 Consider the 
following example: 
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When we speak of the camel as ‘the ship of the desert’, the relational irreducibility of the 
metaphor lies in the potentially limitless suggestions that are evoked by considering the camel on 
the model of a ship: the implied corollaries of a swaying motion, a heavy and precious cargo, a 
broad wilderness, a route mapped by stars, distant ports of call, and so on. Saying merely ‘camel’ 
does not bring in these associations at all….24 
 
Thus, the metaphor of the camel as ‘the ship of the desert’ genuinely tells us something about 
camels that we would not have been able to learn without the help of the metaphor. The range 
of associations evoked by metaphors such as this one is, then, one of their principal 
advantages and, according to Soskice, one of the chief reasons why they are indispensable. 
Moreover, the evocative function of metaphors can, she stresses, be particularly important 
within religious language, where it might serve to facilitate a new range of experiences—ones 
for which there may be no established literal description. 
 This might suggest that Soskice regards the principal function of metaphor as evocative. 
However, she argues strongly that it is a mistake to view metaphors and models (in other 
words, extended metaphors) as having a primarily evocative function. Rather, a ‘model in 
religious language may evoke an emotional, moral, or spiritual response but this does not 
mean that the model has no cognitive or explanatory function. In fact the reverse is true; the 
model can only be affective because it is taken as explanatory…. The cognitive function is 
primary.’
25
 
 Soskice further claims that in order to explain the cognitive function of metaphors and 
models within religious language, we must consider the way in which they are actually 
employed. So, using the model of God as ‘father’, which is so prominent within Christianity, 
to illustrate how models function in religious language, she points out that those who use this 
particular model implicitly base further convictions upon it.
26
 For example, the use of this 
model presumes that ‘if God is our father, he will hear us when we cry to him; if God is our 
father, then as children and heirs we come to him without fear; if God is our father, he will 
not give us stones when we ask for bread’.
27
 Such convictions are, she argues, action-
guiding—and therein lies their cognitive content. 
 Soskice also argues that metaphorical terms can ‘be seen as denoting candidates for real 
existence’, and that such terms can be reality depicting despite the fact that they are not 
‘exhaustively descriptive’.
28
 Indeed, metaphorical terms are characteristically vague, and this, 
Soskice argues, is one of their virtues. In both religion and science, Soskice avers, 
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metaphorical terms are indispensable precisely because they are vague. Without this 
vagueness, there would be a tendency for people to regard the terms as expressing a complete 
understanding of the aspect of reality in question. They would thus be prone to dogmatism 
and resistant to any proposed changes to the theory expressed by these terms. In consequence, 
their theories might cease to be responsive to any new knowledge which comes to light. Thus, 
the great virtue of metaphor in the context of religious and scientific theories is that it allows 
us to refer to what really exists, while conceding that our knowledge of the relevant aspects of 
reality might be incomplete. And metaphor makes this possible because it is a way of using 
language that allows us to refer to things without defining them. Soskice: 
 
This is the fine edge at which negative theology and positive theology meet, for the apophatic 
insight that we say nothing of God, but only point towards Him, is the basis for the tentative and 
avowedly inadequate stammerings by which we attempt to speak of God and His acts. And…this 
separation of referring and defining is at the very heart of metaphorical speaking and is what 
makes it not only possible but necessary that in our stammering after a transcendent God we must 
speak, for the most part, metaphorically or not at all.29 
 
The great advantage of metaphor, then, is that it allows people to refer to God without their 
having to define ‘God’. Thus, metaphorical uses of language would seem to allow religious 
believers to talk meaningfully about God (supposing that they do in fact succeed in referring), 
while simultaneously avoiding the danger of misrepresentation. For example, a theist might 
employ the phrase ‘God is a rock’. A statement such as this, if Soskice is correct, can refer to 
God but should not be understood as either defining or describing the divine. Thus, it can be 
true that ‘God is a rock’, without having to be literally true. The claim can be true insofar it 
tells us something about God’s supposed characteristics—but we should not understand it as 
the claim that God is literally a rock. 
 Promising as this approach has seemed to many, there is an apparent difficulty with the 
claim that religious language is metaphorical. When we use metaphor to talk about everyday 
things—for example, using ‘pig’ to refer to gluttons—both are not usually too far removed 
from our experience. But in the case of religious language this is not so. Consider again the 
example, ‘God is a rock’. Clearly, we know what a rock is. But does this really tell us 
anything at all about God? The problem is that what one of the terms refers to is unknown. 
 Soskice responds to this objection by pointing out how important metaphor has been in 
the development of scientific theories. Let me give an example. When people started using 
the word ‘electron’, they did not know much about electrons or their properties. And clearly, 
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electrons are not accessible to our experience in the way that rocks are. Initially, scientists 
referred to an electron as a particle, despite the fact that electrons are, in a number of crucial 
respects, not at all like the particles we encounter in our immediate experience. In certain 
respects, electrons are nothing like grains of sand, for example. Other scientists then began 
referring to electrons as waves. But again, the use of ‘wave’ was clearly metaphorical. In 
several crucial respects, an electron is nothing like the surface of the sea. Seemingly worse, 
what, exactly, is a wave-particle supposed to be? Yet the metaphors of wave and particle were 
indispensable in enabling scientists to pick out the objects they wished to study. The term 
‘wave-particle’ was able to refer to electrons without literally describing them. And once 
those particles were referred to, they could be studied empirically. 
 Electrons, then, provide an example of how metaphors allow us to refer to things outside 
of our immediate experience without literally describing them. If scientists can do that with 
respect to things like electrons, then surely believers can do the same with respect to God. In 
short, metaphors can enable us to refer to entities that we would be unable to refer to were our 
uses of language exclusively literal. 
 This seems a very strong response because, if Soskice is right, it implies that theologians 
are not doing anything significantly different, in a sense, from what scientists are doing. Both 
require metaphors to refer to the objects that concern them. However, it could be objected 
against Soskice that scientists can conduct experiments that give us some reason for thinking 
that the phenomena they are able to study directly are caused by electrons. New data often 
requires some revision in what we take electrons to be. And this suggests that we are learning 
more about electrons. But what is the parallel evidence that suggests we are successfully 
referring to God? Soskice argues that the theist’s confidence in the existence of that to which 
his or her ‘God-talk’ aims to refer is grounded in religious experience.
30
 Moreover, she 
believes that the experience of saintly individuals is likely to carry the most weight.
31
 Such 
people may be the best placed to instil in others confidence that their talk about God has a 
real referent. Moreover, there is a sense in which a religious tradition embodies the 
cumulative experiences of its participants through the ages. It is a tradition of experience and 
of interpretation, against the background of which metaphorical religious language is used 
and understood. Soskice argues, then, that religious traditions, scriptures and the experience 
upon which they are based can provide sufficient background information to give us an idea 
of that for which the unknown term in religious language stands. But this response clearly 
presupposes some degree of faith, and is therefore of little use to a sceptic. Moreover, any 
reliance on private experiences, as religious experiences tend to be, seems to make religious 
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claims immune to public testability. Yet it is surely the public testability, at least in principle, 
of certain of the claims made about electrons that appears to justify our ever-increasing 
confidence that we are successful in referring to them. 
 Nevertheless, in drawing attention to the relation between metaphor and religious 
experience, Soskice has pointed to a possible explanation of the vital importance of 
metaphors within religious language. Let us, finally, turn to a theory of metaphor that—
although it has, surprisingly, not yet been employed by philosophers of religion—offers the 
prospect of according a central role to this relation. 
 
An Alternative Approach to Metaphor 
 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, like Soskice, have developed a theory of metaphor that 
builds on the work of Richards and Black. They accord metaphors a far greater role in our 
cognitive structure than do any of the theories examined so far. For they argue not only that 
metaphors play a significant and irreplaceable role in the way we think but also that huge 
areas of our language are structured by them. Hence, in their influential book entitled 
Metaphors We Live By,
32
 they aim to undermine the view that literal language is primary and 
that metaphorical language is dependent upon it. Indeed, they go so far as to argue that what 
many people regard as literal language only functions within a context that is deeply 
structured by metaphor: ‘Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think 
and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature’, they aver.
33
 With this claim, Lakoff and 
Johnson go far beyond the views of metaphor we have thus far considered. Soskice, Richards 
and Black regarded metaphor as a figure of speech, albeit a potent one that enables the 
creation of meaning. Lakoff and Johnson clearly regard metaphor as much more than this, for, 
in their view, it is constitutive of our thought. 
 Moreover, they argue that the claim that our conceptual experience is pervasively 
metaphorical has two further implications. First, given the widely accepted view that our 
conceptual system affects our experience, and given that our conceptual system is structured 
by metaphor, then if we are to understand our experience, we must understand how the 
metaphors we employ function. Second, given that reality is presented to us only in our 
experience, and given that our experience is shaped by our conceptual system, then metaphors 
play a crucial part in defining what is to count as reality. Given these convictions, it is 
unsurprising that Lakoff and Johnson argue that the notion of metaphor should be recognized 
as a central philosophical concept. It is the key, they claim, to comprehending how conceptual 
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systems are related to our experience, and to how understanding emerges from this 
relationship. 
 The primary focus of interest within the work of Lakoff and Johnson is on our conceptual 
systems—in other words, on the ‘concepts that structure what we perceive, how we get 
around in the world, and how we relate to other people’.
34
 They take it for granted, however, 
that we cannot simply look inward and thereby study our conceptual system. Put another way, 
we cannot make it an object of direct knowledge. Nevertheless, they assume that our 
conceptual system can be studied; namely, by means of the language we use. Because our 
language, they claim, is based upon our conceptual system, then the structure of our language 
provides evidence regarding the structure of our conceptual system. And the linguistic 
evidence, they maintain, establishes ‘that most of our ordinary conceptual system is 
metaphorical in nature’.
35
 
 The force of the argument Lakoff and Johnson present derives from the many examples 
they provide in support of their case. One of the most persuasive of these, which is often 
referred to by subsequent authors, is the metaphor ‘argument is war’. Lakoff and Johnson use 
this metaphor as an illustration of a ‘conceptual metaphor’, which is a metaphor that exercises 
a structural effect both on our thought and on our everyday activity. They begin by drawing 
attention to a variety of metaphors that are subsidiary to the conceptual metaphor ‘argument is 
war’, and which, themselves, form part of our ordinary way of talking about arguments. 
Consider, for example: ‘Your claims are indefensible’, ‘He attacked every weak point in my 
argument’, ‘His criticisms were right on target’, ‘He shot down all of my arguments’. 
Commenting on these common metaphorical ways of speaking, they claim: 
 
It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win 
or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions 
and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a 
position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do 
in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there 
is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc.—reflects 
this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this 
culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.
36
 
 
In understanding arguments in terms of war, then, we thereby stipulate what arguments 
consist in within our culture. And anyone who did not employ the metaphor ‘argument is war’ 
would not experience ‘arguments’ in the way that those who accept the metaphor clearly do. 
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In fact, such a person would be unable to engage in arguments as they are conceived within 
our culture. 
Hence, the activity of arguing, and the experience one has while doing it, are, Lakoff and 
Johnson aver, metaphorically structured. Without the metaphor, one cannot engage in the 
activity, and hence one cannot have the experience that goes with it. Because conceptual 
metaphors, like ‘argument is war’, have the function of structuring our thought, activity and 
experience, metaphor cannot simply constitute the peripheral feature of our language use that 
traditional theorists had presumed. Rather, conceptual metaphors consist in structuring 
concepts that control whole networks of our thought and activity. Moreover, there are 
numerous conceptual metaphors, and together they structure most of what we think, say and 
do. And only within such networks, Lakoff and Johnson argue, does literal language function. 
 Metaphors, then, can structure not only our thinking but also our activities. And Lakoff 
and Johnson insist that a large number of our activities are ‘metaphorical’; in other words, our 
performance of those activities is structured by metaphor. Indeed, there is a very real sense in 
which our use of metaphorical concepts has created these ‘metaphorical’ activities. Thus, as 
Lakoff and Johnson argue: 
 
New metaphors have the power to create a new reality. This can begin to happen when we start to 
comprehend our experience in terms of a metaphor, and it becomes a deeper reality when we 
begin to act in terms of it. If a new metaphor enters the conceptual system that we base our actions 
on, it will alter that conceptual system and the perceptions and actions that the system gives rise 
to.37 
 
So, consider love—an example frequently deployed by Lakoff and Johnson to illustrate the 
extent to which metaphors can shape our experience. Most people would surely agree that 
love, like most, if not all, of our emotions, defies full conceptualization in non-metaphorical 
terms. In order to talk and think adequately about love, we therefore require conceptual 
metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson provide as examples: ‘Love is a physical force’; ‘Love is 
patient’; ‘Love is madness’; ‘Love is magic’; and ‘Love is war’.
38
 Each of these metaphors 
structures a possible way of thinking and talking about love. Thus, by adopting the ‘Love is a 
physical force’ conceptual metaphor, we are able to say things like: ‘I could feel the 
electricity between us’; or ‘His whole life revolves around her’. Adopting a different 
conceptual metaphor would enable us to talk in a very different way about love. We could, 
instead, adopt the ‘Love is war’ conceptual metaphor, and thus say such things as: ‘He is 
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known for his many rapid conquests’; ‘He won her hand in marriage’; or ‘He overpowered 
her’. 
 But if Lakoff and Johnson are correct, these conceptual metaphors do more than merely 
allow us to think and talk about love in novel ways. A new conceptual metaphor will also 
enable us to experience love in a new manner. In other words, the alteration in our conceptual 
system caused by the introduction of a new conceptual metaphor is such as to change what we 
experience. Consequently, when people began to think of love as war, Lakoff and Johnson 
argue, they also began to experience love as war—their reality had begun to change. 
Therefore, when different people come to diverge in the conceptual metaphors they employ to 
structure their thought, language and experience, then there is a sense in which they will no 
longer share the same reality. And this way of understanding how it might be that different 
people experience different ‘realities’ may shed light on cultural diversity, given that many 
striking differences between conceptual metaphors can be found across cultures. 
 As users of metaphor, then, we can transform ‘reality’, at least in the sense of bringing 
about significant changes to the ‘perceptions, conceptualizations, motivations, and actions 
that constitute most of what we experience’.
39
 And as Lakoff and Johnson point out, this 
makes metaphor a political concern.
40
 For people in power—and in the twenty-first century, 
those in control of the media might be thought to be some of the chief wielders of power—
can control which metaphors become dominant, and hence can strongly influence how we 
experience our world.
41
 Once a metaphor has become accepted, people will experience the 
world in the terms it suggests, and thus will view what it entails as true. Consequently, those 
who shape the metaphors dominant within a culture will thereby exercise a disproportionate 
influence on what is regarded as true within that culture. 
 Despite the tremendous significance of this conclusion, Lakoff and Johnson regard issues 
concerning truth as secondary to what they consider to be the deeper issue: namely, that 
conceptual metaphors structure our understanding of our experience, and, through that 
experience, they structure our understanding of the world. Hence, those who can persuade us 
to adopt their metaphors will, if Lakoff and Johnson are right, be able to lure us into accepting 
their worldview. And it is this that Lakoff and Johnson take to be of prime importance. We 
shall consider the relevance of this for religious language shortly. But first, it is worth noting 
that this is not the only danger inherent in the use of successful conceptual metaphors. 
 As we noted earlier, the substitution theory held that metaphors were incapable of 
communicating anything that could not equally be said by means of non-figurative language. 
But Lakoff and Johnson argue that the account of non-figurative language presumed by the 
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substitution theory is itself based upon a conceptual metaphor: namely, that of a ‘conduit’.
42
 
This conceptual metaphor has three subsidiary metaphors: ‘ideas (or meanings) are objects’; 
‘linguistic expressions are containers’; and ‘communication is sending’. According to Lakoff 
and Johnson, these metaphors structure the way in which many people think about 
language.
43
 And the image this pattern of metaphors yields is that ‘[t]he speaker puts ideas 
(objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the 
idea/objects out of the word/containers.’
44
 Obvious examples of this way of thinking are ‘It’s 
hard to get that idea across to him’, ‘I gave you that idea’, ‘It’s difficult to put my ideas into 
words’, and so on.
45
 Such common linguistic expressions, which seem to be structured by the 
conduit metaphor-complex, would appear to provide considerable support for the theory 
Lakoff and Johnson defend. 
 Thinking about language in terms of the conduit metaphor would seem to present us with 
a structured pattern for understanding what it is that we do with words. But, as Lakoff and 
Johnson argue, this particular metaphor well illustrates how powerful conceptual metaphors 
can be so successful in structuring our experience that they leave us quite unaware of what is 
omitted from the worldview they shape—a further feature of conceptual metaphors that 
should cause us to be wary of them. In other words, through entailing, for example, that 
words and sentences bear meaning independently of the speaker or context, the conduit 
metaphor can effectively blind us to the role that speakers and contexts play in the process of 
communication. Hence, this particular metaphor leaves us without any resources for 
explaining, or even recognizing, situations in which the meaning is not carried by the words 
used but by the context in which they are uttered. Furthermore, the conduit metaphor may 
structure our understanding of language in such a way that we become insensitive to cases in 
which the same sentence will mean entirely different things to different people because of 
their different backgrounds, expectations, and so on. Thus, in structuring our thought, action 
and language, metaphors also screen out various alternatives.
46
 The important moral that 
Lakoff and Johnson draw from this feature of conceptual metaphors is that such metaphors 
only ever provide us with a partial ‘reality’—but one that, fortunately, may be extended by the 
use of complementary metaphors. Clearly, the claim that a conceptual metaphor can hide 
aspects of reality as well as reveal them is of tremendous relevance to an adequate theory of 
religious language, even though this implication of the work of Lakoff and Johnson has not 
been pursued to date. 
 How might this thought be developed, then? As we have seen, conceptual metaphors, 
according to Lakoff and Johnson, are essential if we are to talk and think about things that 
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defy conceptualization in straightforwardly non-metaphorical terms. Many theists, of course, 
with the obvious exception of the literalists, are in agreement that the divine—the mooted 
object of much religious discourse—defies all such conceptualization. God is, therefore, a 
prime candidate for conceptualization through metaphor. Moreover, analysis of what religious 
believers actually say about God would appear to bear out the claim that the content of their 
thought and speech regarding this mooted object is structured by organizing, or conceptual, 
metaphors. Think of ‘God is love’. Not only does this particular conceptual metaphor shape a 
‘reality’ in which God stands as divine carer for all creation but it also excludes a whole host 
of alternatives, such as everything that is implied by conceptualizing the world as ruled by a 
vengeful God. And this, if the theory propounded by Lakoff and Johnson is correct, shapes 
the experiences that the faithful have of their relationship to God. 
 Now, as we have seen, Lakoff and Johnson claim that people who use different 
conceptual metaphors may actually experience different ‘realities’; for, by structuring speech, 
thought and activity, conceptual metaphors create their own possibilities of experience, 
thereby potentially creating new ‘realities’. It may well be, then, that a new metaphor within 
religious language would enable people to experience the divine in ways that were 
unavailable prior to the introduction of that metaphor. Consider, once again, the metaphor 
‘God is love’. By utilising the analysis advanced by Lakoff and Johnson, we could argue that 
when people first began to think of God as love they also began to experience a loving God—
in short, their ‘reality’ had changed. But a similar ‘change in reality’ may have occurred when 
the metaphor ‘God as father’ was introduced into Semitic monotheism by Jesus. Likewise, the 
metaphors employed in the Hebrew Scriptures and the Qur’ān could be regarded as opening 
up new ways of experiencing the divine, and hence as generating new ‘realities’. 
 However, this way of thinking about metaphor in religious language also highlights a 
problematic facet of religious experience. As we have seen, metaphors work, according to 
Lakoff and Johnson, by drawing our attention to certain features of things, while 
simultaneously screening certain other aspects from our attention. Thus, the conceptual 
metaphor ‘God as father’ draws attention to certain features of God (power, providential care, 
and so on), while screening from us certain other purported features that cannot so easily be 
associated with fatherhood (God as nurturer, for example). The metaphor ‘God as father’ 
may, then, facilitate a certain way of experiencing the divine, while closing off numerous 
other possibilities. These observations would seem to converge with the analyses of religious 
language developed by those feminist theologians who have pointed to the negative 
consequences of the almost exclusive use of male metaphors for God within the monotheistic 
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traditions
47
—which is one reason for not relegating the study of metaphor within religious 
language to the exclusive, abstract concern of a few scholars. For if Lakoff and Johnson are 
correct, then we have grounds for thinking that specific conceptual metaphors have shaped 
whole religious traditions. We would have reason to think that such metaphors have 
determined how religious people experience what they take to be the divine, and how they 
understand the language that they use in their attempts to talk about it. And a wariness with 
respect to how specific conceptual metaphors have shaped whole religious traditions could 
have far-reaching consequences for how the divine is conceived in the future. 
 
III. Concluding remarks 
 
While each of the three traditional approaches to religious language continues to find 
advocates, recent theories of metaphor may well provide far superior theoretical accounts of 
religious discourse.
48
 
 Moreover, the view that religious language is principally metaphorical rather than literal 
might well facilitate regarding a range of metaphors or models of the divine as possessing 
equal value, even if, at first sight, they appear to be mutually exclusive (for example, the 
metaphors of father and mother when applied to the deity). And drawing attention to the 
range of possible metaphors could make it harder for one construal of God to trump all 
others, especially when each may be regarded as having something to contribute to a fuller 
religious understanding. This observation could pave the way for an appreciation of how 
much religious people might stand to gain from exploring the metaphors deployed in a range 
of religious traditions. Judaism, Christianity and Islam, for example, all attempt to refer to 
God using distinct, but overlapping, metaphors and models. Viewing these as complementary, 
rather than as rivals, would seem to become a more acceptable option once religious language 
is regarded as functioning in the manner outlined above. And clearly, this could be of 
considerable advantage to the denizens of an increasingly multicultural world.
49
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Rather than exploring the ways in which different conceptions of God might influence 
thought about religious language, I presuppose a particular view of God—that view which is 
dominant within Semitic monotheism—and consider religious language as it is employed 
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